Stefano Predelli discusses the relationships between the central semantic notions of meaning and truth. Part One begins with the study of phenomena that have little or nothing to do with the effects of meaning on truth, and 'the Fallacy of Misplaced Character'. Part Two is concerned with sentences and constructions which bear no interesting relations with questions of truth, but which have important repercussions on questions of meaning. The resulting 'Theory ofBias' is applied to expressive interjections, instances of register and coarse slang, honorifics and nicknames, and derogatory slurs. Part Three argues that some notorious semantic problems ought to be approached from the viewpoint of the Theory of Bias. Predelli introduces the notion of 'obstinateindexicality', which then guides his solution to Quine's 'Giorgione' puzzle, his version of the demonstrative theory quotation, and his defence of the bare-boned approach to demonstratives and demonstrations.